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WHITHER THE DOHA ROUND? 
  
Michael L. Jensen* 
 
 
Recently at a conference on U.S.-China bilateral relations in 
Beijing, United States Trade Representative Rob Portman 
acknowledged that the Doha Development Agenda (Doha Round or 
DDA) of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations “face[s] 
very serious challenges.” Then he made a pitch. In order to “avoid 
losing the opportunity presented by Doha,” which is “a once in a 
generation opportunity to reduce tariffs and reduce trade distorting 
subsidies around the world,” Mr. Portman stated that ‘[w]e need the 
help of WTO member countries . . . to make a push for significant 
progress in the weeks and months ahead.”1 His pitch is as needed as 
his assessment is obvious: on the eve of the Sixth WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Hong Kong in December, the Doha Round is in 
trouble, and only concerted effort by member countries and 
significant concessions by the holdouts can rescue the stalled global 
trade talks.   
 
BACKGROUND 
 
The Doha Round began in 2001 as an ambitious effort to 
improve market access and reform in agriculture, services, and 
manufactured goods. The reasoning behind this approach seemed 
clear: freer trade produces a win-win situation for developed and 
developing nations alike. As just one supporting fact, the World 
Bank reported that during the 1990s, per capita real income grew an 
average of five percent annually in developing countries that 
fostered freer trade, nearly three times faster than the average 
annual increase of 1.4 percent for countries that did not.2 Further, 
“World Bank research found that growth in developing countries 
benefits the poor: average incomes of the poorest fifth of society 
rise proportionately with average incomes. Factors such as rule of 
 
 
1 Ambassador Rob Portman, U.S. Trade Rep., Remarks at a Conference Hosted 
by China-U.S. Relations:  Trade, Diplomacy and Research, in Beijing, China (Nov. 
14, 2005) [hereinafter Portman Remarks], available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets 
/Document_Library/Transcripts/2005/November/asset_upload_file519_8356.pdf.   
2 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA POLICY BRIEF, 
Facts on the Doha Round (Oct. 2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets 
/Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2005/asset_upload_file93_8213.pdf. 
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law, openness to international trade, and developed financial 
markets benefit the poorest fifth of society as much as everyone 
else.”3 Developing countries make up approximately two-thirds of 
the WTO’s membership; a successful trade round could therefore 
have a profoundly positive impact on the global economy. But, as 
the World Bank noted recently, “the liberalization targets under the 
DDA have to be ambitious if the round is to have a measurable 
impact on world markets, and hence poverty . . . .”4 
 
THE KEY ISSUE: AGRICULTURE REFORM 
 
A key issue of the Doha Round has been agriculture reform. 
Although this issue was touched on in the previous round (Uruguay 
Round) of negotiations, the Doha Round highlighted it as a focus 
primarily because so many developing countries have a 
comparative advantage in agriculture and insisted on this issue’s 
inclusion. According to Mr. Portman’s assessment, “[t]wo of the 
three pillars of agriculture reform—eliminating export subsidies 
and reducing domestic support—are pretty well along,” and are “in 
good shape for negotiation.” But the “final pillar”—market 
access—is “not as far along.”5 That is an understatement. After four 
years of negotiations, despite a significant U.S. proposal in October 
meant to reduce tariffs using the “tiered formula” in the July 2004 
Framework, negotiations have made precious little progress 
regarding agricultural market access and reform, let alone the other 
important areas of the ambitious Doha Round agenda. 
Most countries have leveled the blame for the political and 
bureaucratic foot dragging in the agricultural sector at the European 
Union (EU), especially France, for clinging to long-standing and, 
some assert, addictive farm subsidies. But the situation is not so 
simple. As noted recently in the Wall Street Journal, “[a]t the core 
of the stalled talks is a spaghetti bowl of conflicting demands.”6 A 
group of nations (Group of 10) that are net importers of agricultural 
goods, including Switzerland and Japan, have offered only modest 
reductions in their farm sector tariffs, which would leave them in 
 
 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 2. 
5 Portman Remarks, supra note 1. 
6 Scott Miller, Clock Is Ticking on Trade Talks: Doha Round of Negotiations 
Gets Bogged Down in Farm Tariffs, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2005, at A14.   
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some cases higher than the EU.7 Perhaps predictably, some 
members of the Group of 10 have demanded hostage-style, deep 
cuts in tariffs in the manufacturing sector before entertaining 
further reductions in the farm sector.  
Other countries are following suit in their own way, pursing, 
naturally, their own interests. Brazil, for example, as a member of 
the so-called “Group of 20” made up of richer developing 
countries, demands that the EU substantially improve its offer to 
reduce farm sector tariffs, but it adamantly refuses to consider 
reductions of its own high tariffs on the manufacturing sector. As 
another example, India, a fellow Group of 20 member, stands 
firmly behind its own high farm sector tariffs, but it unsurprisingly 
argues that other countries should make more progress in opening 
up the services sector.8 And so it goes, country by country, and the 
result is a largely fractured approach in the Doha Round. While the 
lack of consensus is perhaps most obvious in the agricultural sector, 
there are still huge gaps in how to approach the services and 
manufacturing sectors as well.   
 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS   
 
Early in November, trade representatives from five 
powerhouses (the U.S., the EU, Japan, Brazil, and India) met in 
London and tried—unsuccessfully—to breathe new life into the 
negotiations. Immediately thereafter, representatives of a larger 
subgroup of countries met in Geneva with the same objective and 
the same unfortunate result. As Pascal Lamy, Director-General of 
the WTO, pointedly observed to the delegates in Geneva:   
 
Some have said they are not in a position, at this 
stage, to move further on Agricultural market 
access, unless there is more on the table on NAMA 
[Non-Agricultural Market Access], Services, or GIs 
[Geographical Indications]. Others have said they 
are only able to keep their offer on reduction of 
Domestic Subsidies if there is an improved offer on 
market access in agriculture on the table. Yet others 
say they can only agree to . . . a proposal of cuts of 
its industrial tariffs (NAMA) . . . if there is an 
 
 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
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improvement in, and to the extent of, a new offer on 
Agricultural market access. And we also hear from 
other sides that they will only discuss NAMA if 
there is a sufficient degree of precision on Special 
Products and the Special Safeguard Mechanism.   
 
All of this adds up to some very wide gulfs . . . .9  
 
Mr. Lamy attempted to put the best face on the state of the 
Doha Round by observing that “what is already [on the negotiating 
table] is not negligible,” and that “nobody wants to reduce the level 
of ambition for the Round.”10 But in a burst of candor, Mr. Lamy 
observed that “the question is whether—to use the words of the 
Indian Minister Kamal Nath—we ‘recalibrate’ the expectations for 
Hong Kong—to what can reasonably be achieved or whether we are 
ready to run the risk of making Hong Kong an ‘announced 
failure’.”11 The answer seemed clear in the malaise among the 
delegates and their unwillingness to offer further compromises of 
significance: prepare for the Hong Kong meeting with “recalibrated 
ambitions.”12 
In the wake of these disappointing developments, leaders of 
twenty-one Pacific Rim countries met at the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum in Busan, Korea on November 18–19, 
2005. High on the list of agenda items was the Doha Round. The 
government leaders issued a statement supporting the ambitious 
(read: not “recalibrated”) objectives of the Round heading into the 
Hong Kong meeting. While an unnamed South Korean government 
official lamented that the statement would likely fall on deaf ears, 
another observer of the forum observed more hopefully that “APEC 
includes seven of the world’s 13 largest economies, represents 
more than a third of the world’ population, and constitutes 60 
percent of the global economy and nearly half world trade, putting 
 
 
9 Press Release, World Trade Organization, Lamy Says Differences Require 
“Recalibration” of Hong Kong Expectations, Calls for “Negotiating Spirit” to 
Advance Trade Talks (Nov. 10, 2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/ 
news_e/news05_e/stat_lamy_nov05_e.htm.   
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
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it in a position where it cannot be ignored.”13 President George W. 
Bush and Chinese President Hu Jintao, in a joint press conference 
in Beijing on November 20, also stressed the importance of 
“building consensus on market access issues” at the Hong Kong 
meeting in order to permit a new global trade agreement in 2006.14 
Whether such last minute endorsements will affect the 
substance of the Hong Kong meeting is doubtful. The real question 
is whether, among the widely disparate interests of the 148 
members of the WTO, enough members can muster the courage to 
seize, in Mr. Portman’s words noted above, this “once in a 
generation opportunity to reduce tariffs and reduce trade distorting 
subsidies around the world.” 
 
   
 
       
 
 
 
 
13 Op-Ed, APEC Has a Tough Job Ahead in Freeing up World Trade, 
SHANGHAIDAILY.COM, Nov. 22, 2005, http://www.shanghaidaily.com/cat/5/4/ 
Opinion.htm. 
14 Hu, Peggy B., Bush, Chinese President Discuss Trade Issues at Beijing 
Meeting, USINFO.STATE.GOV, Nov.  20, 2005, http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive 
/2005/Nov/20-731445.html. 
